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RECENT DECISIONS
lishment of his claim, the defendant absolutely refused to pay. The plaintiff
brought an immediate action on the policy without waiting for the sixty days
to elapse. Held, for the plaintiff. Scott v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (Ga. 1925)
129 S. E. 903.
Much confusion of thought has arisen as to when repudiation by one party
to a contract before the time for his performance gives the other party an im-
mediate action for damages without waiting until the time agreed on for per-
formance of the repudiated promise. In the leading English case on the sub-
ject the contract was bilateral and wholly executory, and the reason given for
the decision granting an immediate action was that its denial would require the
plantiff to continue ready to perform on his side in order to have a right of
action upon an actual breach.' That he should be and is excused from the duty
to perform on his part is unquestioned,2 that he should also be excused from the
necessity to perform in order to maintain his right of action is obvious, but
that he cannot be excused from the necessity to perform unless his right of ac-
tion is immediate is a proposition that does not bear analysis. Yet from such
reasoning has developed not only the general rule that an action will lie imme-
diately after repudiation in bilateral contracts,' but also the frequent assump-
tion that the reason for the rule and hence the rule itself has no application to
unilateral contracts Such an explanation justifies neither the rule nor the as-
sumed exception. The only practical merit in the rule is the fact that an imme-
diate action results in shifting the credit load from the plaintiff to the repudia-
tor,'but this reason applies equally whether the contract is bilateral or unilateral
at the time of repudiation. The fact that the instant case represents the weight
of authority as to insurance policies,' whereas an immediate action is denied on
other unilateral obligations to pay money,' illustrates the impossibility of recon-
iling the ramifications of the doctrine. Decisive authority is lacking for the
proposition that anticipatory breach does not apply to unilateral obligations
other than to pay money.
CORPORATIONS-MANDAMUS TO COMPEL CORPORATION TO ALLOW INSPECTION OF
BooKs-AcTION By ADlMINISTRATRIX OF STOCKHOLDER.-In an action by the ad-
ministratrix of a stockholder for a mandamus to compel the corporation to al-
low an inspection of its books by her accountant for the purpose of determining
the value of the stock on which she would have to pay an inheritance tax in
Kentucky, held, mandamus denied. Since a public officer has the power and duty
to examine the books, a separate examination by the petitioner is unnecessary.
Charles Hegewald Co. v. State ex rel. Hegewald (Ind. 1925) 149 N. E. 170.
At common law, the owner of stock in a corporation has a privilege to in-
spect the corporation books and records at a reasonable time and place, and for
'Hochster v. De la Tour (1853) 2 E. & B. 678.
" See 2 Williston, Contracts (1921) § 875.
'Roehm v. Horst (1899) 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780; Wester v. Casein Co.
of America (1912) 206 N. Y. 506, 100 N. E. 488.
1'See Roehm v. Horst, supra, 17; 3 Williston, op. cit., §1328; (1925) 39 Har-
vard Law Rev. 268.
'State Ins. Co. v. Maackens (1876) 38 N. J. L. 564; Callahan v. London &
Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. (1917) 98 Misc. 589, 163 N. Y. Supp. 322; contra:
Borger v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. (1916) 29 Cal. App. 476.
"'Leon v. Barnsdall Zinc Co. (Mo. 1925). 274 S. W. 699; see (1925) 39 Har-
vard Law Rev. 268.
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a "proper" purpose The privilege is specifically enforceable by. mandamus.2
Where it is guaranteed by statute, the right is generally held to be absolute, and
the purpose for which the examination is desired, immaterial.! But such statutes,
while almost universal, are applicable in about half the states to stock books
alone,' and as to other records, the right exists only as at common law The
content of a "proper" purpose seems to have been worked out by balancing
on the one hand the nature of the stockholder's claim to information about
conditions affecting his property, and, on the other, the inconvenience and possi-
ble danger to the corporation from the examination of its books. Accordingly,
a court will not order an examination merely to satisfy a stockholder's curiosity,'
or where the information is desired for the benefit of a rival concern.1 The
purpose must be to protect a definite interest of the stockholder as such.8 There
is no doubt that an examination may be had whenever the stockholder honestly
believes that the corporation is being mismanaged And the desire to know the
true value of the stock is a sufficient reason where the stockholder contemplates
a sale. 0 But where the information may be obtained in another way, as, for
example, by means of a subsequent examination, certain to be made, it seems
to be a fit exercise of discretion for a court to deny an inspection. Thus,
wherever the taxing officers have the power and duty to examine the books of
the corporation,' a separate examination by the stockholder or his representa-
tive should not be ordered. The result of the instant case is therefore sound.
EQUITY-RELIEF FOR A UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF LAw.-An installment payment
on mortgaged property being in default, the moritgagee's lawyer foreclosed and
sold to his client, the plaintiff, for only the installment due, being unaware that
he could sell for the amount of the whole mortgage, and believing that some-
how he could make repeated foreclosures. The mortgagor traded his equity to
the defendant, all the parties sharing the misapprehension of the attorney. Later
the defendant discovered the error and seized the opportunity to acquire the
property by redeeming for the amount of the foreclosure sale. The plaintiff
sues in equity to have the mortgage reinstated. Held, for the plaintiff. Equity
will grant relief for a unilateral mistake of law. Peterson v. First Nat. Bk.
(Minn. 1925) 203 N. W. 53.
See Matter of Steinway (1899) 159 N. Y. 250, 263, 53 N. E. 1103; Guthrie
v. Harkness (1905) 199 U. S. 148, 153, 26 Sup. Ct. 4; 2 Cook, Corporations (8th
ed. 1923) § 511.
' See High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3d ed. 1896) § 308.
' Venner v. City of Chicago R. R. (1910) 246 Ill. 170, 92 N. E. 643; see 2
Cook, op. cit., §§ 514, 518; Canfield & Wormser, Cases on Private Corporations
(2d ed 1923) 569, n.,, but see (1922) 22 Columbia Law Rev. 590.
' See Parker, The Corporation Manual (26th ed. 1925) § 17.5Matter of Steinway, supra.See Varney v. Baker (1907) 194 Mass. 239, 241, 80 N. E. 524.
"People ex rel. Lehman v. Consol. Fire Alarm Co. (1911) 145 App. Div.
427, 127 N. Y. Supp. 348.
'Schondelmeyer v. Columbia Fireproofing Co. (1908) 219 Pa. 610, 69 At.
49; see State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex Banking Co. (1913) 87 Conn. 483,
485, 88 Atl. 861.
Varney v. Baker, supra; Guthrie v. Harkness, supra.
"State ex rel. Brumley v. J. & M. Paper Co. (1910) 24 Del. 379, 77 Atl. 16;
Neubert v. Armstrong Water Co. (1905) 211 Pa. 582, 61 Atl. 123.
Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1914) § 10285; Ky. Stat. (Carrol, 1922) § 4114i
12 (4).
